Hezbollah has the armed forces of the middle class. Hizbullah is generally regarded as the most powerful non-state actor in the world, and stronger than the Lebanese Armed Forces. Hybrid power, the group maintains "strong conventional and non-conventional military capabilities." The party's combat strength has increased substantially since the 2006 Lebanon War.
Hizbullah does not reveal human resources and its estimates vary widely. By 2017, Jane considers that Hezbollah has more than 25,000 full-time warriors and perhaps 20,000-30,000 reserve troops. They were financed partly by Iran and trained by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps of Iran. Hezbollah's military budget runs about a billion dollars a year.
Hizbullah's military strength is somewhat based on the quantity and quality of the rockets they possess, which they use against their main enemy, Israel. The group's strategy against Israel uses rockets as an offensive weapon combined with lightweight infantry and anti-armor units to defend their firing position in southern Lebanon. Estimates of the total number of Hizbullah rockets range from 40,000 to 150,000, which is much more than most countries.
Hizbullah has a limited number of anti-aircraft and anti-ship missiles, as well as thousands of anti-tank missiles, which they understand. The group has no manned aircraft, tanks, or armored vehicles in Lebanon, because they can not resist Israeli air supremacy. However, Hezbollah retained armor in neighboring Syria, including the T-55 and T-72 tanks. The group has built a large number of armory, tunnels, and bunkers in southern Lebanon, and has a large intelligence device.
Hezbollah's tactical strength is protection and concealment, direct shot, and battle position preparations, while their weaknesses include maneuvering, small arms, and air defense. Although the light infantry team and the Hezbollah anti-tank team are highly respected, Hezbollah as a whole "quantitatively and qualitatively" weaker than the Israeli Defense Forces.
Sources generally agree that the Hezbollah power in conventional warfare is better than that of the state military in the Arab world. The 2009 review concludes that Hezbollah is a "well-trained, well trained, highly motivated, and highly developed war machine" and "the only Arab or Muslim entity that successfully confronts the Israelis in combat."
Hizbullah usually does not discuss their military operations and accurate and reliable information about their strengths and abilities are often absent or classified. Hezbollah, Israel, and others may have reason to obscure the movement's capabilities. Hezbollah's overall labor and power estimates vary widely.
Video Hezbollah armed strength
History
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In 1975 Lebanon collapsed into a civil war. Three years later, the Palestine Liberation Organization has occupied much of southern Lebanon in an attempt to gather troops and destroy the state of Israel. Israel attacked in 1982 and destroyed the PLO, but occupied southern Lebanon and created proxy Christian militia, South Lebanon Army (SLA), to hold the territory. This strip of land, a narrow band that runs along the Israeli border, is called a "security zone." The guerrillas and partisans attack the invaders. "Lebanese Shia, motivated by a desire to gather troops against the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon, founded Hezbollah (Party of God) in 1982," with an organization named and reorganized in 1985.
1980s
In 1982, hundreds of Iranian Revolutionary Guards traveled to the rugged Bekaa Valley and began training various Shiite radical groups, including the Islamic Charity and the Dawa Party. The ongoing civil war and the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon created a radical environment in which Hezbollah's religious fanaticism flourished. "The movement gained rapid momentum due to logistical, financial and military support from Syria and Iran" and involved Israel in guerrilla warfare. Physical geography of southern Lebanon is green and hilly with deep valleys, favored by defenders and ideal for "classical" Hizbullah guerrilla warfare. Hizbullah's initial tactical choice involved a wave of human attacks, similar to those used by Iran in the Iran-Iraq War, and terrorist tactics such as abductions, aircraft hijackings, and mass-casualty suicide attacks to wound Israel's determination to fight. Hezbollah was involved in a brief attack to harass and kill and not try to control the territory. Although initially very successful, these options impose enormous costs on the organization in accidents and public opinion. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1985 said the group's command and control were "virtually absent" and described the organization as not hierarchy but determined by personal loyalty, personal rivalry, and family ties. At the moment, operational decisions are inefficient through many of the clerics and imams in Beirut, far from the front line. Hizbullah does have a separate military structure and responsibilities for operations, logistics, communications, intelligence, training, and recruitment. This lack of hierarchy is similar to that of the contemporary left wing liberation movement. Tactics around 1985-1986 primarily planted landmines, blew up IEDs and occasionally gathered armed men groups to shoot Israelis. Hezbollah can not use sniping at this time. An IDF intelligence officer described Hezbollah in the mid-1980s as a "tag-tag group" that "fails at any time," and the 2014 review considers the group's tactical performances during this period poor and "very amateurish." The CIA said that before the spring of 1986, his party's attacks were more "undisciplined despair" than military action.
Despite this problem, the party continued to grow, and in 1986 the CIA considered its military strength to be comparable to that of the main Lebanese militia. The number of Hezbollah memberships and affiliated groups grew from "several hundred" in 1983 to 2,000-3,000 in 1984 and up to several thousand in 1985, and in mid-1986 the group collected 5,000 fighters for an incident in the city of Baalbek in the Bekaa Valley. Hizbullah is numerically smaller than Amal in 1986, but the trend supports Hezbollah. At this time, the organization has many part time warriors and very few full-time members, making it sensitive to victims. "Organizational capability in fighting the Israeli Army and Israeli proxy militia forces," as well as the corruption and inefficiency of Hezbollah's rival Amal, are crucial in building credibility and public support. In southern Lebanon, Amal is widely seen as "too moderate" and accommodating Israel, leading many radical Shiites to support Hezbollah. Hezbollah also received support from the pro-Hezbollah faction of Amal who had seceded from the top Amal leadership. Assessment of Hezbollah's current position varies. The CIA judged at the time that "Hezbollah's policy of confronting Israel and its successors is at work" and that Hezbollah holds a "qualitative advantage" in the battle over the SLA and Amal, while an independent review says that in 1987 Hizbullah's strategic position deteriorated. On April 18, 1987, the Hezbollah human-wave strike at the enriched SLA post failed and left 24 people dead, killing about 5% of the organization's full-time fighters in a single day. As a consequence of this and other such decline, Hizbullah was forced to change its strategy. Fired by the Israelis and overrun by richer sects and political parties of Lebanon, Hizbullah was forced to learn quickly and reassess its tactics, strategies and organization.
The suicide attacks gave way to "sophisticated, coordinated, and timed attacks" and short and quick attacks. In May 1987, Hezbollah began coordinating infantry and artillery as a combined weapon and "enhancing their ability to attack Israeli helicopters, and showing an increase in wound dredging from the fighting." The group moved from a squad-size attack around 1986 to a platoon and company-sized strike in the spring of 1987, and launched a simultaneous attack on several targets in September 1987. Party attacks in the late 1980s became more planned and thriving in complexity, in involving fire of supporters. Hezbollah eliminated most of the mid-level commanders in the late 1980s, delegating their powers to local commanders, improving operational and security performance. The organization trimmed loose troop ranks and also shifted its tactics to IEDs, ambushes and indirect shots. Initially Hezbollah was just one of several militia fighting Israel, but in 1985 it was the best and in the late 1980s was clearly dominant.
In May 1988, after years of rivalry and clashes, Hezbollah launched a brief but intense war with Amal to seize control of Beirut's southern suburb, which at the time occupied about a quarter of the country's population. Because Amal allied with Syria, Hezbollah also clashed with the troops of the Syrian Army that occupied Lebanon at that time. Hezbollah won in street fights and extended to targeted killings and encouraged defections, forcing Amal to seek Syrian mediation. Amal and Hezbollah have remained envious of allies ever since. Although Hizbullah won militarily, they immediately imposed strict Shariah laws in their territory, such as banning coffee and exposing women, and losing the hearts and minds of their people. Most Lebanese are not Shiites, and even most Lebanese Shiites do not want to live in an Islamic state. Support for Hezbollah is much higher than support for the hardline Shiite religious rule. Faced with declining public support and crumbling tourism, Hezbollah was forced to abandon its rhetoric from an Islamic republic and enter Lebanese politics in 1992. Since this incident, Hizbullah has been "Libanising" and becoming more integrated into Lebanese society. Hizbullah's subsequent efforts to create social institutions, rebuilding houses destroyed by the fighting, and bringing waste, jobs, and electricity to Shia areas are essential to building public support. 1989 sees the Taif Accord ending the Lebanese Civil War and allow Hizbullah to intensify its military efforts against the IDF.
1990s
The group increased rapidly in the early 1990s, evolving from the loss of five fighters for every Israeli soldier killed in 1990 to 1.5 in 1993, a ratio that would roughly last until the end of the decade. Hezbollah ended the wave attack in 1990 and began an attack with two units: the attack team and the fire relief team with 81 mm mortar. Gathering combat experience was critical to this tactical improvement, and in the early 1990s, the Hezbollah attack "was characterized by careful planning and well-practiced professionalism." Hizbullah in the early 1990s did a dedicated staff job, mirroring their Israeli enemy. Improved intelligence and reconnaissance capabilities are also a key driver of better overall combat skills. In 1992, Hassan Nasrallah took control of Hezbollah, and he was generally considered to have given a strong leadership. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the party refocused on quality over quantity, improved training, and also gathered more weapons: in the early 1990s, they "had collected a significant arsenal." Their current little arm includes AK-47 and M16 rifles, Bangalore torpedoes, hand grenades, RPGs, and M40 rifles. Iran is largely responsible for increasing this weapon and flying a number of weapons and ammunition to Damascus every month. Hezbollah introduced full combat uniforms in the early 1990s and increased their small unit tactics and field security.
Throughout the 1990s, Hezbollah waged IED cats and rats with IDF, with Hizbullah developing increasingly sophisticated IEDs and IDF countermeasures. Hezbollah may have used an IED that detonated cell phones against the IDF in early 1995. The IEDs will be the main source of Israeli casualties during the occupation period, and IED attacks increased by about 50% annually from 1995 to 2000. On 29 September 1992, the organization launched its first coordinated attack at some leading edge. In 1993, Hezbollah was involved in seven days of intense battles with Israel, which resulted in massive damage to Lebanon's infrastructure and civilians, but little sustained military damage to Hezbollah or Israel. The conflict also saw the primary use of Katyusha rockets being guided into Israeli civilian territory by Hezbollah, tactics used by the PLO a decade earlier and one that would be the decisive practice of Hezbollah in the future. Hezbollah used the first AT-3 anti-tank (ATGM) missile on September 9, 1992 and used its first AT-4 Spigot missiles in 1997, the same year Hizbullah acquired a strong ATW ATGM. The anti-tank weapons used by the party continue to increase in quality during the duration of the uprising. In 1998 Hezbollah destroyed three main Merkava Mk 3 battle tanks with these missiles. Hezbollah began seriously developing anti-tank tactics in 1997, focusing on the ability to reach the same spot in tanks several times to defeat the sophisticated Israeli reactive armor, a tactic that remains part of the Hizbullah sustenance today. Although ATGM Hezbollah's weaponry at the time - and still today - remains much lower than the Spike IDF system, capable of destroying Merkava tanks is a psychological victory. Hezbollah also increased in their ability to use mortar and artillery during this time. However, not all Hezbollah weapons are successful. Although Hezbollah acquired the SA-7 'Grail' anti-aircraft missile and fired it for the first time in November 1991, they would barely succeed in attacking Israeli planes. Hezbollah's anti-aircraft capability remains one of the group's biggest weaknesses. Hezbollah fighters used "basic light infantry tactics" during this period, such as IEDs, mortars, and small attacks.
Around 1995, a small group of fighters went to Bosnia to train Muslims in the civil war. This was probably Hizbullah's first expedition effort. Hizbullah continues to find suicide attacks morally acceptable, but gradually its use is depleted because they are no longer tactically effective; the group only launched four suicide attacks in the 1990s. This is part of the party's long-term tendency toward non-terrorism forms of violence. During the 1990s, Hezbollah specifically targeted Shiite army in the SLA for defection, defection, or intelligence. Along with the organization's use of PSYOPS and propaganda wars, this caused moral fall in the SLA. The SLA morals, and even the IDF morals, declined as the uprising continued. Although the uprising sometimes seemed "warm" in the early 1990s, Operation Grapes of Wrath in 1996 greatly increased the level of violence. Hezbollah and Israel are engaged in a sixteen-day campaign marked by thousands of rocket and artillery attacks and intensive fighting. Hezbollah launched hundreds of rockets into Israel during the conflict, and "rocket performance [has] increased especially between 1993 and 1996." The campaign ends with a written April Definition, which sets the "rules of the game" well understood and allows retaliation if both parties violate the "red line," especially attacks against civilians. Since then, Hizbullah has followed a peculiar doctrine of escalation and prevention.
Fighting briefly passed after the 1996 conflict when Hezbollah recovered from the fighting, but the logistics of the movement were "resilient," and the group dramatically increased the level of violence thereafter. While Hezbollah conducted 100 attacks from 1985-1989 and 1,030 attacks in the six-year period from 1990 to 1995, it launched 4,928 attacks from 1996-2000, including at least 50 attacks per month over three years and over 1500 attacks in 1999 alone. After abandoning the tactics of a frontal attack on the SLA and IDF post around 1987, Hezbollah returned to training a decade later with radically changed tactics. On September 18, 1997, Hezbollah attacked 25 outposts simultaneously and used the ATGM team to target reinforcements. At the end of the occupation, Hezbollah used heavy weapons and engaged in a firefight several hours with the enemy. In October 1998, Hezbollah first deployed explosively explosive penetrators, powerful and powerful IEDs that could penetrate almost any armor. Hizbullah regarded 1998, 1999, and 2000 as the most successful years of rebellion, and in 1997 and 1998 the combined Israeli and SLA casualties exceeded Hezbollah. A research paper by analyst Iver Gabrielson argues that in the late 1990s, Hizbullah has become a "tactically capable organization". By identifying and targeting Israel's weak point, the death toll, Hezbollah was able to win the atrition war. In the midst of increasing violence, bad morals and strong political pressure at home, the war in Lebanon became too much for Israel. At 6:48 am May 24, 2000, the IDF left southern Lebanon for the first time in 18 years, and the SLA militia soon collapsed. Although Hassan Nasrallah once promised to "slaughter" SLA members in their beds, there was no revenge killings.
2000s
From 2000 to 2006, Hizbullah made a strategic choice to build a large amount of military infrastructure in southern Lebanon south of the Litani river. In addition, Hizbullah increased the quantity and quality of their weaponry, acquiring advanced anti-tank missiles such as AT-14 Cornet. Starting just before Israel's withdrawal, Hizbullah built significant military infrastructure in southern Lebanon. IDF and independent observers know that Hezbollah has built some infrastructure, but the scale can not be anticipated. The interwar period was characterized by limited and sporadic combat and several casualties on both sides: between 2001 and 2004, Hizbullah launched only 16 attacks. Hezbollah continues to study Israel and adopt the lessons learned, and the group spends a great deal of effort gathering information about Israel. Changing mobility strategies high, Hezbollah instead became relatively fixed with bunkers, stocks, and pre-wake fighting positions. During this time, Hezbollah also obtained the first UAV from Iran and sent militants to Iraq to train "Special Groups" to wage a guerrilla war against America.
In 2006, Hezbollah kidnapped two Israeli soldiers in a failed attempt to bid for the release of the caged Hizbullah terrorists. Israel responded with tremendous power, sparking the 34-day Lebanon War. During the war, Hezbollah was described as "an organized, well-trained and well-equipped squad" and "fighting hard." In 2006, Hezbollah pursued a deadlock, an integrated deadlock and an asymmetrical strategy of rejection. Hezbollah launches rockets into occupied areas and cities of Israel while using light infantry, bunkers, and anti-tank teams to defend southern Lebanon and attack the IDF. The group focuses on small, village-based self-sufficiency units, providing friction in front of the house with somewhat effective command-and-control structures and low mobility. In 2006, Hizbullah used the "Defense Web Complex." "These are characterized by mutually supportive defense positions, interconnected with tenacious, excessive communication, and underpinned by stacked and concealed inventory.The fighters are often negligent, but well-trained and equipped with top-of-the-line antitank and antipersonel weapons, the-line. They were able to implement a flexible and preconceived plan and show agility at a lower tactical level. "Hezbollah is willing to fight from villages and other civilian areas, which while violating the laws of war is tactically beneficial. Terrain and climate negate Israel's advantages in armored warfare and maneuvering and testing infantry skills, where Hezbollah is strongest. Hizbullah's tactics, including light infantry, anti-tank weapons, and rocket fire to Israel, are a continuation of the tactics of the 1990s.
The group is becoming more conventional, transitioning from a guerrilla organization to a hybrid actor with the ability to absorb damage and maintain high intensity battles from time to time. The war ended with UN Security Council Resolution 1701 and the results were inconclusive; neither side reaches their goal. Hezbollah claims "a divine victory". Hezbollah identified their major deficiencies in the 2006 war because of their lack of air defense, which they regarded as a "serious problem" and their main task to handle. Other identified weaknesses are shooting skills, small unit tactics, and exposure to battlefield tactics, gun depots, and fighting positions. Furthermore, the UN Security Council resolution that ended the war forced Hezbollah to leave the dense network of underground bunker and fortresses and hand over southern Lebanon to the Lebanese Armed Forces peace force, known as UNIFIL. Although group armaments, operational security, and intelligence increased considerably between 2000 and 2006, there has been little improvement in group strength structures or tactical abilities. There is no academic consensus as to whether the war is strategically favorable to Hezbollah. The group's popularity in the Shiite community, Lebanon as a whole, and the Middle East surged after the war.
Post-2006
After the 2006 war, Hezbollah conducted a review after their weapons and tactics. Hizbullah rated their bunker performance and disguised shooting position in the "security bag" fence in the countryside as something of value. The Hezbollah review found that the "village guard" of the reserve forces, almost entirely veterans of the insurgency, had performed well. Hezbollah fighters reportedly knew their local terrain intimately, understood their mission, and had absolute confidence in the victory. The Quds Forces of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC-QF) also wrote a lesson review for Hezbollah, which reportedly adopted a number of recommendations. After the war, IRGC-QF enhanced material transfer, funding, training, and intelligence sharing. There was hardly any rocket fire to northern Israel after the war, and Hezbollah rejected some of the attacks.
Since the war of 2006, Hezbollah has continued to increase its weaponry, power, and intelligence. The group is widely used as a textbook definition of a hybrid actor, with conventional and unconventional war skills. As a hybrid actor, Hezbollah's main weakness is its need to retain civilian support to hide among the population while causing huge losses to civilians if war breaks out. This led to Hezbollah having to justify its actions to maintain public support and to avoid war. Since the start of the civil war in Syria in 2014, Hizbullah has deployed a large number of its workforce in the country, where the group is engaged in counter and massive operations. Most sources agree that this spreading has undermined Hizbullah's public morals and public image while enhancing the organization's ability to maneuver on a large scale and interoperability with allied forces. In 2017, Hizbullah's military operations include thousands of fighters deployed to Syria to support the Assad government, about 250-500 fighters in Iraq train Shiite-dominated Popular Mobilization Command, and about 50 fighters in Yemen by rail and covert support. mission to Houthi rebels.
For 35 years, Hezbollah evolved from "a small group of revolution-oriented conspirators" to "Lebanon's most powerful and popular organization." The group is changing from a "militant little cadre" to a semi-military and regional military organization. Professor Augustus Richard Norton said that the main reasons for Hezbollah's long-term success were its resistance to the Israeli occupation, institutional building, anti-Western worldview, piety, pragmatism and Iranian support. Scholar Iver Gabrielson said the main reason for Hizbullah's victory was "pragmatism, social service and political participation." Andrew Exum says that Hezbollah won by combing the kinetic (violent) and non-kinetic operation lines. Throughout its history, the organization has carried out various types of warfare, including terrorism, rebellion, sub-state conflict, hybrid war, and counter-insurgency.
Qualitatively, Hizbullah is portrayed as a cruel and arrogant person, willing to use physical strength to influence political change, and to prioritize hard power. This party strategy combines extreme rhetoric, prudential tactics, and long-term risk taking. Arguably, the main source of power is its effective and sustained violence. Some sources say that Hezbollah's combat power is the foundation on which its political power, public support, and legitimacy lie. As a Hezbollah warrior says in 2017, "You are strong or weak, and if you are weak, you will be eaten." Now, Hezbollah is strong. "
Maps Hezbollah armed strength
Training
In general, Hezbollah runs most of their own training camps, with the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, especially the Quds Forces, playing an integral role. IRGC runs a training camp in Lebanon, while Hezbollah fighters have traveled to Iran for more advanced training. Hezbollah also runs many of its own camps, especially for preliminary training. Assessment of how much Hezbollah training takes place in Iran varies, but perhaps most training takes place in Lebanon. Hizbullah is widely reported to send members to Iran for more advanced training than can be delivered in Lebanon, but estimates of how many Hezbollah supporters who visit Iran for military training vary widely, ranging from "hundreds" from 2006 to hundreds of thousands. In general, there is no expert consensus on the level of IRGC involvement in arming and training Hezbollah.
In terms of design, the Hizbullah training camp was compiled and inspired by Israeli training camps, which Hezbollah studied. The training camp is located in a remote area of ​​Lebanon under Hezbollah control and is protected by checkpoints equipped with uniformed guards. Facilities generally include firing ranges, offensive courses and battle locations in urban areas, and sometimes also driving IED tracks and ranges. The largest camp, located in the west of Beqaa Valley, contains artificial Lebanese villages and main roads. All members, including clerical administration, must graduate from a 45-day paramilitary course. It is held in Lebanon and teaches basic combat skills, while full time combatants will eventually specialize in areas such as explosives or ATGM.
Training includes long marches, weapons familiarity, reconnaissance and observation, and navigation skills. Fighters are reportedly well-trained in pre-vision, indirect fire shots, and ATGM use, especially TOW missiles, AT-3 Saggers, and Kornet. Fighters are known to be transported to a training camp in a dark van and have little knowledge of the identity of the instructor or their friends. Hezbollah's ability for sniping and light infantry troops is highly regarded, with members "highly skilled in surveillance and intelligence gathering in the field." Hezbollah snipers are often described as trained and "avoiding conversation, being arrogant to others, dressing well and hating small talk." They are often taught college with studies in mathematics and seem to be required to take classes in foreign languages ​​and creative writing. Hezbollah snipers then the Afghan Shia sniper unit. Hezbollah is trained with American and Israeli military manuals that emphasize friction tactics, mobility, intelligence gathering and night-time maneuvers.
The source describes Hezbollah in peacetime as "cautious, patient, [and] in tune with intelligence gathering" that does staff work and long-term planning. Hizbullah's active duty warriors are regularly described as trained and disciplined.
In turn, Hizbullah has inherited "knowledge of military tactics and recruitment techniques" since the 1980s to various other organizations. The party mostly trains Shiite groups, such as Shia militias in Iraq during and after the American occupation and reportedly trained Houthi, Syrians and Iraqis in Lebanon and elsewhere. IRGC-QF Iran loves to work with Hizbullah because they are Arabic speakers and provide a degree of separation to Iran. Hezbollah's training on Iraqi militants mainly focused on small arms, surveillance, small unit tactics, and communications, focusing on the effects of IED attacks, the use of EFP, and kidnappings. Training also includes intelligence skills and snipers. To a more limited extent, Hezbollah has trained a large number of Islamic radicals, including fundamentalists in Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, the Palestinian Territories, and Gulf countries. There are reports in question that Hezbollah has trained a small number of Lebanese Army personnel as well. Party training is highly appreciated. In 2017, a Hezbollah commander claimed that 120,000 fighters had passed the Hezbollah training camp. Hizbullah's labor force estimates vary widely; for example, in 2002 the US State Department said that Hizbullah had several hundred cooperatives and several thousand supporters.
History
In 1984, the training was centered on Sheihk Abdullah Barracks in Lebanon, with fighters sleeping in the barracks at night and departing during the day for fear of air strikes. After the Israeli air strikes at their training camp in the Bekaa valley in 1994, Hezbollah training was more furtive in the Bekaa Valley with small tents and foxholes. The end of the 2006 war brought huge labor demands requiring the group to expand its training facilities, and since then Hizbullah has a fairly large and integrated training camp.
In the early 1980s, some Hezbollah fighters traveled to Iran and fought against the Iraqi Army in the Iran-Iraq War. In the 1990s, IRGC trained Hezbollah in infiltration techniques, explosives, and intelligence operations to promote continued guerrilla warfare. Top leaders, including Hassan Nasrallah, were reportedly trained for several months in North Korea in the late 1980s.
The number of full-time fighters and Iran's liaison officers appeared to have declined in the early 2000s as the group slowed from the peak of the insurgency. The Iranian-led direct training camp in Lebanon seemed to end around 2006 and travel to Iran for training paralyzed in 2010 because it was replaced by a battle in Syria. Training in Iran provides an opportunity to train weapons larger than practical in Lebanon.
Since 2006 and especially the involvement of groups in the Syrian Civil War, Hezbollah has been involved in enormous manpower development. Some observers say it has degraded the quality of the organization, although Hezbollah fighters claim this did not happen. Since 2006, the group has built a training camp in Lebanon that focuses on urban warfare. Experienced warriors rotate from the front line to the role of the instructor in the training camp. Agents from the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence also train Hezbollah, and North Korean instructors may participate in the 1980s and 1990s. Training by IRGC is described as serious and deep. The Syrian regime has been involved in Hezbollah training for decades, but since the start of the Syrian Civil War, the pattern has reversed, and Hizbullah now "provides extensive training, advice and logistical support to the Syrian Government." In response to the high demand for labor from the Syrian Civil War, the group reportedly shortened background checks and training regimens for new recruits, although the quality remained high.
Recruitment
Recruitment is a slow process, taking months to years, with recruiters looking for pious, conservative, and disciplined individuals. "Internal security wing" Hezbollah is working with the Iranian intelligence service to inspect recruitment options for more advanced training, with careful family background checks. Promotion in the rankings stems from patient talent searches from trusted and talented individuals. Fighters are generally older and more educated; one study found that Hezbollah fighters who were killed in action had more education than their civil counterparts. To an unusual level for a non-state actor, Hezbollah members specialize in areas such as IED, artillery, engineering, and communication.
Backup
Hizbullah humanitarians include full-time fighters and loose reserve troops, who may only occasionally fight for Hezbollah or affiliated with other political parties. Hezbollah has no official membership list.
Assessment of group reserve forces, also known as "village guards" or part-time warriors, varies considerably. These people have jobs outside Hezbollah and only take up arms for major military involvement or as part of a two-week "duty" per year. Israeli sources call reserve troops "relatively unskilled", while Hezbollah describes them as effective fighters as full-time warriors. One American think tank said they performed remarkably in the 2006 war, while others called them "less able" than full-time warriors. The training of the Hizbullah reserve force is also unclear. Andrew Exum said that they did not appear to be trained by Iran, and some may be former militia members, while analyst Nadav Pollak said they were recruited from the Mahdi Scouts and sources said that almost all of them were former militia members. Some who are portrayed as Hezbollah's reserve army seem to spontaneously take up arms or are not officially affiliated with the party. Hezbollah forces have been rotated through Syria in short-term placements, along with regular fighters and party commanders.
Supply
Hizbullah is largely supplied by the Iranian and Syrian nations by land, air and sea. In addition, Hizbullah acquired some equipment from other markets, such as Lebanon, North America, and Europe. The majority of Hezbollah weapons were acquired or built by Iran and then transported to Lebanon from Syria.
Iran provides most of Hezbollah's funds and weapons, flying them through Iraqi airspace to Syria. Syria supplies some advanced weaponry and allows Iran to use Damascus as a waypoint to supply the group. Iran flies most of the material to Damascus airport airports and sends lorry trucks to Hezbollah, with some material flown directly to Lebanese airports. Both the support of Iran and Syria increased after the 2006 Lebanon War, with Iran's support increasing more. Hezbollah owes its unique military power to Iranian logistical support. Hizbullah's goal, in Iran's view, is to block any American or Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear facilities.
In the 1980s, Hizbullah was supplied with caution and with "relatively small amount of weapons." Logistical problems, ongoing Iran-Iraq war, and Syrian Hizbullah's vigilance limit the number of trainers and supplies that can be delivered to Hezbollah at this time. Syria released a large amount of military supplies to Hizbullah in the spring of 1987 when the organization focused specifically on fighting the IDF in southern Lebanon. During his presidency, Hafez al-Assad allowed the smuggling of small arms and anti-tank missiles limited to Hezbollah, with Bashar al-Assad greatly increasing the number of Iranian and Syrian weapons after he took power in 2000. Bashar al-Assad shifts Syrian relations with Hezbollah from followers to strategic partnerships. Hezbollah also obtained weapons from corrupt Syrian military officers, the black market of Lebanon, the SLA, and factions losing the Lebanese Civil War. The weapon increased substantially after the war of 2006, with Syria viewing the conflict as a victory, seeing the Hezbollah as an enduring Israeli army and causing significant casualties. After the war, Iran reportedly supplied SA-7, SA-14, SA-16, and Mithaq-1 MANPADS, BM-21 Grad, Fajr-3, Fajr-5, Falaq-1, and Falaq-2 rockets, and weapons anti-tank RAAD-T and RPG. Syria supplies 230 mm and Khaibar-1 rockets, and Kornet, Konkurs, Metis-M and RPG-29 anti-tank weapons. The armament again increased after Israel bombed Syria's suspected nuclear reactor in 2007, with Assad transferring M-600 missiles to Hezbollah in response. In 2009, weapons shipments were described as "frequent and large." Finally, Syria's supply of Hezbollah was accelerated again in May 2011 in response to the Syrian Civil War, with Syria transferring weapons "arsenal" to Lebanon to keep them out of the hands of the rebels. Syria is also reported to increase arms shipments to Hezbollah to persuade the party to fight on behalf of the regime. The shipment of weapons from Iran is also increasing at this time, with Quds Force apparently worried that Assad's regime could fall and their window to supply Hezbollah could end. According to one observer, "there are so many things coming across the border... Hezbollah does not know where to put it." Claims of certain weapons should be treated with caution, however: there is a claim that almost every weapon in Syria has been transferred to Hizbullah.
All, or most of all, Iranian military aid to Hezbollah passes through Syria, and if Syria does not cooperate, Hizbullah's ability to obtain weaponry will decline dramatically. Because Iran and Syria are Hezbollah's main patrons, mostly Hezbollah rockets, small arms, money, and ammunition transit through Syria. The only other efficient route for Iran to supply Hizbullah through Turkey, but Turkey is not in tune with Tehran and since 2006 has blocked Iranian trucks and aircraft from passing through its territory. Sending supplies by sea from the port of Bandar Abbas to the port of Latakia in Syria has been used in the past, but it takes longer and risks the ban.
Because the Syrian air defense network was once able to protect the country from Israeli air strikes, Hizbullah has for decades used western Syria as a logistics and supply center. The area houses Hezbollah's training camp and weapons depot. Historically, Damascus International Airport is a key stop for Hezbollah fighters on their way to more advanced training in Iran.
Hezbollah gained some arms from the black market and possibly from the Lebanese army. Double use technologies, including night vision goggles, laser range gauges, GPS receivers, advanced aircraft analysis and design software, stun guns, nitrogen laser cutter, naval equipment and ultrasonic preventative tools are purchased from private vendors in the United States and Canada at early 2000s. Hizbullah is capable of fighting at night and has sophisticated night vision technology. Israel and several sources claim that Iran has set up two underground weapons factories in the Bekaa valley of the mountains of Lebanon, producing Fateh-110 missiles and many other weapons. Construction is reported to begin after 2012. Hizbullah and IRGC have previously suggested that the party can build some of its own armaments. The factories are suspected of having hundreds of missile capacity per year.
Since the start of the civil war in Syria, Israel has launched an air raid on the "advanced" or "game-changing" weapons in Syria that it says are aimed at Hezbollah. Reportedly, Israel has banned Fateh-110/M600 guided missiles, drones, anti-ship missiles, and air defense systems. Most sources say the air strikes are effective but imperfect in stopping the flow of sophisticated weapons to Hezbollah.
Military
Hezbollah is widely described as comparable or stronger than the Lebanese Armed Forces in military force. The reasons cited are better disciplines of Hezbollah, better experience, and better weaponry, which gives Hizbullah "a clearer" military and combat capability better than LAF. In addition, some say that LAF suffers from distrust and sectarian conflict, while Hizbullah does not. In addition, the group is described as more capable and dangerous than the Sunni extremist group in Lebanon and more capable than UNIFIL. One study says that comparing Hezbollah with the typical Arab military, the main difference is the ability of Hizbullah in tactical maneuvering, the ability to use weapons with skills, and the autonomy and initiative given to small units of Hizbullah. As a senior US official said, "Hezbollah is very good." For decades, there have been reports that the party was exhausted by fighting and on the verge of collapse; these reports seem to be inaccurate.
Hezbollah has not deployed suicide bombings against military targets since December 30, 1999, but may have been prepared to do so during the 2006 Lebanon War. Hezbollah is a fugitive among terrorist organizations in the use of suicide bombings, as about 85% of Hezbollah suicide bombings strike military targets. Hizbullah has not launched a terror attack against American interests since the mid-1990s and has not attacked US interests in Lebanon since 1991.
Light infantry
Hizbullah was founded as a mild infantry force and remained primarily composed of mild infantry to this day.
In 2006, Hezbollah's Hezbollah guerrilla force "was among the most dedicated, motivated and highly trained" in the world. Voice of America reports that "Hezbollah fighters have been educated from a young age to submit to strict military discipline and nourished in martyrdom culture, believing that God sanctioned their cause," adding that "their military training and ideology are very strict." Hezbollah in 2006 was "well trained, well-led and well-equipped" and in-depth defense. Intelligence surveillance, planning, and intelligence gathering "meticulously" supported Hezbollah's combat mission. Hizbullah operations are characterized by tactical agility, use of cover, sophisticated weapons, survival, complex operations, advanced training, and effective command and control. For larger operations, Hizbullah sometimes demonstrates the strength of "organized duty", including the attack team, infringement elements, and support teams. They do not fight like we thought, "said one soldier." They move even harder. They are good in their own land. "The Hizbullah cell is flexible and can quickly merge into a larger force or operate independently when it is cut off.Logically, southern Lebanon is divided into 75 independent Hezbollah zones connected together as a network, but IDF's compacted and used weapons combine weapons, , able to beat Hezbollah comfortably even at its strong points.Assessment 2018 by the Israeli military leadership is that the organization has 45,000 troops standing with many war-tested fighters.
In 2006, Hezbollah fighters "often participated in an extended live IDF shoot-out." Hezbollah will generally wait for Israel to enter a village before starting the battle, rather than engaging in open spaces. Most fighters wear Hezbollah uniforms, while a small number wear IDF civil clothing or uniforms in combat. Hezbollah fighters in the 1990s and 2000s mostly wore M81 forests and olive knits, with recent fighters also wearing multicam. Hezbollah fighters fired at close range, fired directly with the IDF, and launched a counterattack up to a male platoon. The soldiers showed their tenacity and plan and carried out a complex ambush. Familiarity close to their area of ​​operations, broad civilian support, and strong communication networks support the fighters. Fighters rely on "superior mobility, fighting spirit, and popular support" to counter Israel's technological advances. Israeli Brigadier General Gal Hirsch described the house-to-house battle with Hezbollah as "a full contact operation" I mean, direct combat between our soldiers. " In 2006, Hezbollah fighters were clad in uniforms, and often had equipment used by state military such as body armor, dog tags, and helmets. Hezbollah is strongest when defending its home territory in southern Lebanon, and has a "strategic advantage" here. One of Hizbullah's most powerful attributes is his skill in guise and camouflage, sometimes portrayed as good as Israel.
Some Hezbollah units attempted to attack Israel in 2006, but Israel denied all the attacks. Many commentators expect Hezbollah to make substantive efforts to capture Israeli territory in future wars.
Anti-armor
Hezbollah's anti-armor capability consists of an ATGM team with 5 or 6 fighters. Typical teams have two highly trained operators, inside Hezbollah called "sniper tanks" or "Mirkava warriors," and two or three coolies to move heavy missiles. Fighters are trained in anti-tank guns, ambushes, and camouflage. Hezbollah apparently stole a combat simulator from Fouad Shehab Command and Staff College and used it to train an anti-tank team. Reportedly, during the 2006 war, the most skilful anti-tank teams from Hezbollah were held in reserve in the hope of a major Israeli assault and did not see any battles. One of Hizbullah's general tactics is to wait under the protection of an Israeli vehicle to pass, then attack from behind, where the armor is weakest. Fighters deploy Israeli tanks with dozens of cheap ATGM to strip off reactive armor and active protection systems, then use powerful missiles like Kornet, Toophan or RPG-29 to destroy tanks. The ATGM team also targets individual soldiers and buildings occupied by missiles. They operate with infantry as part of a combined arm. To avoid air strikes and counter attacks, teams are heavily dependent on mobility. Since 2006, Hizbullah seems to have made more efforts to use cheap recoilless and ATGM rifles in their mix.
In 2006, about 12-15% of Hezbollah's forces were part of the ATGM team. They managed to integrate the ATGM team with indirect fire, which gave the group the ability to position their troops and conduct more efficient attacks. The ATGM team could involve Israel within a few kilometers, giving Hezbollah the ability. Anti-tank tactics have some successes and are a major source of Israeli casualties, accounting for at least 50 deaths. In addition to using their weapons with skills, Hezbollah also uses a variety of anti-tank missiles, which pose problems for the IDF.
The New York Times reported that 20% of ATGM attacks on tanks caused casualties or impregnable armor, but the Israeli military report showed this figure was higher, at 45%. Hezbollah fought with maneuvers and attacked the fortified Israeli position. Hizbullah's strategic maneuverability is a major weakness, but party skills in tactical maneuvers are "adept". Although the fighters are very active in their area of ​​operations, Hezbollah's strategic position of defense is essentially static. IAF's massive IAF weapons and communications problems mean that retreating or attacking is rarely possible. Instead of retreating, Hezbollah members unleashed their uniforms and disappeared into the civilian population. Hezbollah conducted an ambush separating Israeli infantry from the units of armor and inflicting more casualties per Arab fighters than previous Israeli opponents. However, the ATGM team has a poor and slow night fighting capacity to regroup when retreating.
Armored forces
In 2015 or 2016, Syria reportedly provided Hezbollah 75 T-55s and T-72 tanks for use in the country, as well as other armored vehicles. This power is confirmed in the 2016 parade held in al-Qusair, Syria. Hezbollah also operates the T-55 and artillery tanks lent from SAA and has unidentified number of BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles. Hizbullah does not use armor in Lebanon to fight Israel, because the vehicle is outdated and the party can not fight Israel's absolute air superiority.
Special troops
Hezbollah has trained "special forces" fighters since the 1990s, which is currently part of the "Radwan Unit". They had special experience in small unit raids and tactics and according to Hezbollah carried out "ambushes, killings, or operations requiring profound infiltration." They are confidential but are regarded as "very professional and capable" and "tough guerrillas who excel in the art of operating in secret." According to Israeli Lieutenant Colonel Roni Amir, "when the SOF Israel team met [Hezbollah SOF] on one occasion during the firefight, members of the Israeli team initially thought they had somehow joined a separate detachment of the Israeli SEAL." Training lasts 90 days. They are described as highly disciplined full-time warriors, and in the 1990s headquartered in Beirut. SOF Hezbollah includes Unit 1800, which provides training for terrorists in the Palestinian territories, Unit 910, which performs "external operations" in Israel and abroad, and Unit 3800, which supports Iraqi Shiite militant groups, especially in building IEDs. Hizbullah SF participated in the Battle of Bint Jbeil and led the Battle of al-Qusayr. Hezbollah SF is heavily involved in the Syrian theater.
Command structure
Hizbullah is structured like a normal military organization. It has a hierarchical structure and centralized planning and decentralized implementation, as is typical, although it has a greater degree of compartmentalization than normal. "Hizbullah's military wing is organized hierarchically, but operates in a cellular way with good operational and communications security to avoid detection of Israeli censorship and air strikes." Hizbullah has a flexible tactic and they have no high chain of command, instead delegating more authority to local commanders. Autonomous infantry cells with "considerable independence," including choosing when to strike, comprise most of the organization's fighters. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah explained in a 2013 interview that during the 2006 war they had delegated "freedom of judgment" to the village level, and that some villages had decided to stand and fight. On the other hand, Hizbullah's high command affirms "strong operational control" over its strategic missile force. Hizbullah's headquarters in Beirut maintain direct control over long-range missiles, with short-range missile control and possibly being transferred to regional commanders. In the Lebanese war, Hizbullah's high command had control over enough to completely stop or launch a rocket attack. The concept of Hezbollah's operations centered around a short-range rocket attack on Israel. "Hezbollah proved to be a highly dedicated and professional combat force... Hezbollah succeeded in embracing a new doctrine, transforming itself from the dominant guerrilla force into a formidable quasi-conventional fighting force." In general, little is known about Hizbullah's decision making process. The party has made significant investments in its command and control infrastructure since 2006.
The 2009 review describes Hezbollah in its summary as "capable of far more complex tactical actions than an inhumane person, demonstrating obvious sophistication and ability to carry out major combat operations." Analysts widely regard the group as "a very capable organization" and one of the most innovative non-state armed actors in the world. Hizbullah is considered more capable than the Palestinian group in terms of training, discipline, and central command. In the war of 2006, Hezbollah was able to carry out mission-type commands, which increased the effectiveness of combat, but was still very much outnumbered by the IDF in a one-on-one battle. In the war of 2006, fighters have the autonomy to operate without direct orders if they are cut off. However, this seems unnecessary, since the chain of command was preserved during the war. Although Hezbollah's mission command allows local leaders to take the initiative and be flexible, it also means that Hezbollah units can not support each other in combat. Hezbollah troops in general, but not always, consist of seven to ten people. They have a lot of autonomy and independence, but also have a chain of command down to Beirut. The use of Hezbollah stocks, not the logistics carts, and "the high degree of autonomy given to junior leaders" distinguishes them from normal Arab soldiers. Hezbollah is practicing a decentralized mission command in which top management is responsible for long-term planning but not generally for tactics or operations. In 2006, Hezbollah's commando style and high-autonomy styles resulted in organizations behaving on the battlefield similar to the IDF. Hizbullah orders and controls are effective, but "low-tech". It consists of wires, optical fibers, runners, signals, and civil communication networks. Hezbollah rarely transmits the radio-electronic spectrum. Hizbullah is very flexible for Iran's interests, but it does not seem to be controlled directly by Iran. Hizbullah's status as a Lebanese nationalist movement, and its need to maintain cross-confessional support, may be the biggest obstacle to growth. Hizbullah evolved from strong and localized asymmetric actors into regional military forces.
Hezbollah terrorist operations are fragmented in separate sub-groups of "black-ops" called "Islamic Jihad Organization" or "Organization of External Operations". Today, Hizbullah is "a terrorist organization with conventional capabilities disguised as an agent of humanitarian government."
Geographic command
Lebanese Shiites live in three geographically dispersed areas: the Bekaa Valley in eastern Lebanon, southern Lebanon, and southern Beirut. Hizbullah was formed in the Bekaa Valley and began challenging Amal to control the southern and impoverished southern suburbs of Beirut in the 1980s, reaching control there in 1990. As the guerrilla war against Israel intensified, Hizbullah expanded to southern Lebanon, the fortress of Amal, and eventually reaching the military. the virtue there as well.
Following the departure of Israel from Lebanon in 2000, Hizbullah is known to have restructured itself into territorial command, but there is disagreement as to what exactly their geographic command is. Many sources say that Hezbollah has three commandments: southern Lebanon, the Bekaa Valley, and southern Beirut, while Hezbollah military expert Nicholas Blanford says the group also has a Mediterranean command. Some IDF sources describe the party's Syrian operations as "Eastern Command" as well.
Most group training camps, along with logistical infrastructure, are located in the rough Bekaa Valley in east Lebanon near the Syrian border. This command may be called "Unit Haidar". Hizbullah's operations in this area are mainly centered around the city of Baalbek. In the north of the Litani River, Nabatieh Heights keeps the group's long-range rockets and provides depth of defense. This is apparently part of Beirut's command, headquartered in Dahieh, Beirut, and also responsible for command and control, intelligence, and propaganda. Finally, the operational core of the group lies to the south of Litani near the Israeli border, with a large number of short-range rockets, fighters, and fortifications. This group, known as the Nasr unit, did most of its fighting from the villages, with fighting also occurring in the mountains. Small Mediterranean command, which some sources did not mention, foreign frogs, coastal surveillance, anti-ship missiles, and "marine assets".
From 1982 to 1992, Hizbullah was based in Shayk Abdallah Barracks in the town of Baalbek in the Bekaa Valley.
Infrastructure
Hizbullah has built "vast, advanced, and comprehensive military infrastructure in populous areas of Lebanon." Since Hezbollah can not challenge Israel's air superiority over Lebanon, this group is highly decentralized, with no important infrastructure or center of gravity. Party infrastructure basically consists of two parts: a secret bunker network in a rural area used by highly trained fighters such as anti-tank teams, and fortified villages defended by local residents and reserve troops.
Hezbollah is trying to reduce the signs of weapons and to build a hardened defense position to reduce Israeli air strikes. Some Hezbollah bunkers are located very close to UN observation posts or Israeli borders, and have flowing water, thick concrete, and weeks of supplies. Infrastructure was reportedly built mainly in 2003-2004 and overseen by Hezbollah commander Fouad Shakar.
In 2006, the IAF quickly destroyed all 17 group border observation posts on the Blue Line. Similarly, Israel destroyed the well-maintained group headquarters complex in south Beirut, which included a fifteen-story building, with air strikes. The complex oversees the administration, logistics, labor, and intelligence work. As a result, Hezbollah has grown more decentralized and moved more underground infrastructure. The organization may have a central command center under the Iranian embassy in Beirut. In the 2006 war, Hezbollah "prepared the battlefield intelligently" and adjusted their forces to Israeli threats. The south-east of Lebanon is very lucrative for defenders, and Hezbollah extends this advantage by anticipating how the IDF will struggle and build or acquire the infrastructure necessary to block the IDF. Just as Hezbollah builds large bunkers, Hizbullah also stores weapons and builds infrastructure in villages and civilian cities. This allowed Hizbullah to wage war from the urban and rural areas of southern Lebanon.
While Shia villages in southern Lebanon are fortified with headquarters and bunkers, Hizbullah tends to operate on the outskirts of Christian villages and Druze due to lower civilian support. The party "conquered the skilled urban terrain" and "and held a strong fortress near non-combatants." Hezbollah has a large number of real estate in southern Lebanon and offers discounts in return for civilians storing weapons in their homes. They extensively use civilian houses and buildings as battle sites, arguing that "a house can be destroyed, a village can be destroyed, but not a homeland." This group stores weapons in mosques, schools, hospitals, and other protected locations.
Nature reserve
Israel names the "nature reserve" to Hizbullah's huge underground bunker network, barracks, hideouts and firing positions located in the rare rural south of Lebanon. Hezbollah's combat engineers have built a position of defensive shooting and strong points hidden throughout southern Lebanon since 2000. Hezbollah's bunker is well defended, with blast doors and security cameras, and deeply buried to block Israeli air strikes. The castle is also well disguised, with a launch location that is very hard to find.
In some atypical cases, bunkers are found buried hundreds of meters underground, with several feet of concrete protection and enough food and living space to last for weeks without resupply. Some of Hisbullah's tunnels are thousands of meters long. Israeli sources said that North Korean instructors traveled to Lebanon in 2004 and oversaw the construction of Hizbullah's underground infrastructure. In 2013, the US federal court found that North Korea gave Hizbullah "sophisticated weapons, expert advice, and
Source of the article : Wikipedia
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