Frantic Operation was a series of seven bombing operations during World War II by American aircraft based in Great Britain and Southern Italy that landed on three Soviet airfields in Ukraine. The operation began in June, 1944 and ended in September.
Video Operation Frantic
Overview
The American plan to use the air base in the Soviet Union began when the United States Air Force staff (USAAF) studied shortly after the German invasion on June 22, 1941. After Japan's attack on the United States on December 7, the concept was expanded to reach Japan's Japanese Islands from Siberia. However, Soviet air cooperation was negligible until 1942, and it was not until the Conference of the Foreign Ministers (Moscow Conference) in Moscow in October 1943 that the American delegation raised the issue officially with the Foreign Commander Vyacheslav Molotov.
At the Tehran Conference in late November 1943, President Franklin D. Roosevelt personally proposed the use of Soviet base by American aircraft to Marshal Joseph Stalin. In this case he was assisted by the personal pleas of his son, Colonel Elliott Roosevelt, also present, who requested the base to use his surveillance plane and then operate from Italy.
The position papers given to Stalin emphasized surveillance and bombing operations, and Stalin agreed to proceed with the plan "in principle." American heavy bombers stationed in Britain and Italy will fly missions to the heart of the Nazi region or occupy Eastern Europe. After that, they will land at an American air base in the newly restored Soviet region, re-arming and refueling, and then attacking other targets on their return flight.
Operation Frantic, originally known as Baseball Operation, was intended to permanently form three groups of heavy bombers in Soviet territory, but only a small contingent, about 1,300 people, eventually being released to US bases in the Soviet Union.
During the four months of major operations, 24 targets in German-controlled territory, some unprecedented in the effective range of US strategic bombers, were attacked.
While the aircraft bombing technique hardened the German air defenses, in practice most of the targets have come within reach of the US bombers flow from Italy and the UK. Soviet vetoing of several targets prevented the use of more effective bases.
The operation was reduced and finally stopped because of 1) a terrible German air strike on base in June, 2) Soviet and non-cooperation hostilities that began in August, and 3) the inability of Americans to accept permission to use the base to support the Warsaw Uprising, which deteriorated relations between the two countries.
The main operational difficulties faced by US forces were the inadequate protection of troops by the Soviets. The Soviets rejected US requests to introduce radar artillery and adequate night combat support, and US aircraft were often fired by Soviet forces.
Three bases reached its peak in July and August 1944, with a very limited complement of 1300 US officers and troops. In October, operations were conducted on the basis of "crew skeleton", with the winter contingent in Poltava only about 300. Americans remained there until evacuation after VE-day.
Operation Frantic had a greater historical interest for the development of Soviet-American relations than its effect on the German war effort. Started with great expectations, eventually making a discordant note depicting the Cold War.
Maps Operation Frantic
Destination
The ability to attack distant German targets is not the only, or even the ultimate goal of America for Operation Frantic. Political and military leaders also wanted to 1) establish a precedent and practical basis for the subsequent Japanese bombing of Siberia, after the Soviet Union opened its second front in the Pacific; 2) provides a model for developing trust and cooperation between two forces, considered important to win an approaching peace and build a peaceful postwar relationship; and 3) develop close cooperation and exchanges in the support areas, including telecommunications and meteorology, air surveillance and air transport networks.
After approval was given by Moscow in February 1944, there was a rapid buildup. Exchange staff made; the first "echelon" of American personnel began to arrive; and the US delegation flew to Moscow in a B-17 operation, which was used to show American bombing tactics to Russia. A USAAF Eastern Command (General Alfred Kessler) was established in Poltava, operating in parallel with the new US Military Mission to Moscow (General John R. Deane).
When a high-level US delegation led by the deputy chief of staff of the United States Air Force (USSTAF), deputy chief of staff for operations, General Frederick Anderson (accompanied by Colonel Roosevelt), visited Moscow and bases in May 1944, so front for the actual operation can be given. At the same time, Anderson let his side know that the ultimate goal was the formation of American air forces numbered in the Soviet Union and the transition to Siberian operations. For diplomatic reasons, this can not be expressed to Russia. Therefore, America must be satisfied with a much smaller presence in the Soviet Union than originally contemplated.
Frantic is also tied to other US initiatives. In Tehran, General Henry Arnold (head of the Air Force) offered Stalin bombers 300-400 B-24, but noted that they would need a major Soviet training program in the United States. Stalin did not accept this offer; on the contrary, American bombers who made a security landing in Siberia were kept and copied by Soviet factories.
Britain does not share some US goals, and Prime Minister Winston Churchill believes the operation is useless. Royal Air Force did not participate in Frantic.
The Soviet objective in approving the operation can not be determined with certainty. Unlike America, the Soviet Union lacked victory doctrine or "theology" of victory through aerial bombardment, and only had an imperfect long distance air force. Furthermore, when the survival of the Soviet Union was in doubt, Marshal Stalin rejected the offer of air support, which demanded maximum loan delivery. By the time Stalin finally agreed to activate the plan, in a meeting with US ambassador W. Averell Harriman on February 2, 1944, the victory of the Soviets was guaranteed. The indication is that Stalin hopes to obtain all possible information about superior American technology, and assigns officers with the stated learning objectives as much as possible about the equipment and concepts of US operations. For example, the Soviet Union demanded and acquired a Norden secret shot, and also acquired a broad European photographic coverage of American aircraft. However, this goal cuts two ways, as USAAF also learns about the extreme vulnerability of the Soviet Union to air strikes, and the primitive technical and infrastructure conditions prevailing on the Soviet side.
Measured against its purpose, after a brief euphoria, Frantic developed into a costly and glorious failure that was one of the worst losses suffered by the American air force. Instead of strengthening the alliance, he reveals his fundamental weakness and ends with the great bitterness of America. However, a valuable operation against Axis was done, and both sides learned a lot about the others.
Airfields
After meeting Stalin on February 2, 1944, Harriman reiterated that "Stalin approved a limited project on 200 bombers and six airfields." In the end only three bases are formed. In haste, the US Strategic Air Force in Europe established a headquarters detachment at Poltava Airfield, in the Poltava region of Ukraine SSR at the end of April 1944. Poltava was designated as a USAAF 559 Station for security purposes and thus called on all messages. and written correspondence. Poltava is one of three Ukrainian installations operated by Headquarters, USAAF Eastern Command. The other is Pyriatyn Airfield (AAF-560) and Myrhorod Airfield (AAF-561). The three bases are located along the Kharkov-Kiev railroad tracks and are already far behind the front. Poltava and Mirgorod will be used by heavy bombers (B-24 Liberators, B-17 Flying Fortresses), while Piriatyn will be used for long-distance fighters (P-51 Mustangs, P-38 Lightnings).
Bases are farther than USAAF wanted, and although best efforts are hardly enough for heavy bombers. Soviet infrastructure is incompatible with Western standards; spring turns everything into a sea of ​​mud; and the reverse Germany has destroyed everything they can. In Poltava, Germany abandoned a headquarters building, but he was stuck with a radio-controlled bomb, however, was found on time. Also, American officers found themselves dealing with an unfriendly and suspicious Soviet bureaucracy. In general, US officers agree that the Red Air Force is cooperative and eager to help, but its political structure is obstructive and a source of endless delays and problems. After August-September, the Soviet attitude became universally hostile, and in 1945 the small American detachments were left in great bitterness. Winston Churchill was less enthusiastic about Frantic, believing that it put more trust in Stalin than the wise, and events seemed to keep him.
Heavy equipment and large supplies go by sea to the ports of Murmansk and Archangelsk at the North Pole, and then by train to the airport in Ukraine. Supplementary supplies and key personnel flew over the Air Force Command aircraft from the ATC base at Mehrabad Airport, Iran. Since there is no trans-Caucasian railway, an additional voyage crosses the Caspian to Baku. Logistical demands are enormous because almost everything must be brought from the United States, even high-octane flight fuel and steel runways. Complicated negotiations eventually refined a total of 42 round-trip ATC missions to create an operational base for the AAF, and allowed an additional level of two weekly support missions to retain the US contingent. Flight communication problems eventually ended in compromise, allowing the US crew to perform navigation and radio tasks with Soviet observers at all related communications centers. To support Operation Frantic, ATC delivered 450 personnel and thirty six thousand pounds of cargo in June 1944.
Known units
- Eighth Air Force
- 45th Combat Wing (in Poltava Airfield, ca 75 bombers)
- 96th bombing group, RAF Snetterton Heath, B-17 Flying Fortress
- Bomb Group 388, RAF Knettishall, B-17 Flying Fortress
- 452d Bombing Group, RAF Deopham Green, B-17 Flying Fortress
- The 13th Combat Wing (at Myrhorod Airfield, ca 75 bombers)
- 95th Bombing Group, RAF Horham, B-17 Flying Fortress
- 100th Bombing Group, RAF Thorpe Abbotts, B-17 Flying Fortress
- Bombing Group 390, RAF Framlingham, B-17 Flying Fortress
- Escort Fighter (in Pyriatyn Airfield)
- 4th Combat Group, RAF Debit, P-51 Mustang
- Combat Group 352, RAF Bodney, P-51 Mustang
- 355 Fighter Group, RAF Steeple Morden, P-51 Mustang
- 357th Fighter Group, RAF Leiston, P-51 Mustang
- 20th Combat Group, USAF Kings Cliffe P-51 Mustang
- Fifteenth Air Force
- 2d Bombing Group, Amendola Airfield, B-17 Flying Fortress
- 97th Bombing Group, Amendola Airfield, B-17 Flying Fortress
- 99th Bombing Group, Tortorella Airfield, B-17 Flying Fortress
- 483 Bombing Group, Sterparone Airfield, B-17 Flying Fortress
- 14th Fighter Group, Triolo Airfield, P-38 Lightning
- 31st Combat Group, San Severo Airfield, P-51 Mustang
- 82 Combat Group, Vincenzo Airfield, P-38 Lightning
- 325th Fighter Group, Mondolfo Airfield, P-51 Mustang
- Attached from: Twelfth Air Force
Operation
A photographic reconnaissance photo with a handful of F-5 Lightnings was sent to operate local flights from Poltava in late May, and "triangle trade" in reconnaissance operations using Italy, Ukraine and Britain preceded the bombing and also ran along with them. during the summer. These flights were conducted by units from the 325th Wing Watch, commanded by Colonel Elliott Roosevelt.
After a lot of preparations in three Ukrainian airfields by the forward element of the Headquarters, USAAF East Command and Air Transport Command, the first shuttle mission ("Frantic-Joe") was performed by Fifteenth Air Force B-17 Flying Fortresses and P-51 Mustang they fighter fighter took off from the airport around Foggia, Italy, raided the railway bases in Debrecen, Hungary, and then flew to Ukraine.
- First Load Mission (Watermelon)
- June 2, 1944
- 130 B-17, controlled by 70 P-51, bombarded marshaling pages in Debrecen, Hungary ( 47Ã, Â ° 31? 10? N 021Ã, Â ° 37? 41? E ) and land on the base in USSR; B-17 in Poltava and Mirgorod and P-51 in Piriatyn. One B-17F (42-30319, 97 BG, 414 BS) lost over target; 27 other B-17 aircraft, were forced to depart to Oradea, Romania's marshaling yard, also hit Debrecen.
- June 6, 1944
- 104 B-17s and 42 P-51s attacked the airfield in Gala? I, Romania and back to their shuttle base in the USSR. Eight enemy fighters were shot down and two P-51Bs (42-103369, 42-103432, 325 FG, 318 FS) were lost.
- June 11, 1944
- 126 B-17s and 60 P-51s leave their Russian shuttle base for Italy, completing FRANTIC-1. On the way, 121 B-17 aircraft bombard Foc? Ani, Romania airspace ( 45Ã, Â ° 46? 29? N 027 Â ° 11? 31? E ) One B-17F (42-3383, 97th BG) is missing.
- Second Aircraft Mission (Eighth Air Force)
After the first shuttle mission, the consensus was a very successful operation, and the atmosphere of celebration and high spirits reigned in Poltava. The second shuttle attack was commissioned by the Eighth Air Force B-17 to attack a synthetic oil facility near Berlin on the way to Ukraine.
- June 21, 1944
- 145 of 163 B-17 opened an open bomb between Britain and the Soviet Union. 72 P-38, 38 P-47 Thunderbolts and 57 P-51s deliver B-17 to target, synthetic oil mill in Ruhland, Germany ( 51Ã, Â ° 29? 00? N 013 Â ° 53? 36 ) 123 B -17 bombed the main target, 21 bombed the marshaling page in Elsterwerda ( 51 Â ° 27? 32? N 013 Â ° 30? 57? E ) and the B-17 alone bomb on the marshaling page in Riesa ( 51Ã, Â ° 18? 34? N 013Ã, Â ° 16? 46? E ) because of bomb shelf damage. 65 The 4th Combat Group P-51 relieved the first guard troops and accompanied the B-17 to the Soviet Union. 20 to 30 Luftwaffe fighters attack troops; in combat produced by P-51B (43-6784, 4th FG, 335 FS) and six German warriors destroyed; B-17F (42-3490) from the 385th Bomb Group, the 549th Bomb Squadron driven by Matthew Totter was damaged by throws and missed three machines. It flies to Sweden, interned, and then converted to SE-BAN, a Swedish aircraft. 144 B-17s landed in the Soviet Union; 73 in Poltava, and the rest in Mirgorod. 64 P-51 land remaining in Piriatyn.
What was not known at the time was that after the attack on Ruhland, the attacked B-B was being overshadowed from a distance by the Luftwaffe Heinkel He 111 bomber, which identified the Ukrainian airfield on which they landed. Other sources indicate that Germany already knows the location and has assembled troops to strike in Minsk in anticipation.
On the night of June 21st, the Combat Wing of B-17 that had previously landed at Poltava suffered severe losses in a German air raid. Hungarian aircraft also participated in the attack. Personnel was alerted around 2330 when it was announced that German bombers had crossed the front line in the general direction of Poltava. At 0030, the Pathfinder plane pulled out a flare just above the airfield and ten minutes later the first bomb was dropped. For almost two hours, an estimated 75 Luftwaffe bombers attacked the base, indicating a very high degree of accuracy. Nearly all bombs were dropped in the area where the parked landing where only B-17s were parked indicated without question that the B-17 was a specific goal of the rioters.
Of the 73 B-17s that landed in Poltava, 47 were destroyed and most of the rest were badly damaged. An American B-17 copilot, Joseph Lukacek, was killed. His captain, Raymond Estele, was seriously injured and died later; some other men suffered minor injuries. The hard-to-reach fuel and ammunition stores from the United States were also destroyed. Three days after the attack, only nine out of 73 planes in Poltava were in operation. The 50-caliber machine gun held by the Soviet high command will suffice no effect on the Luftwaffe, as no plane is shot down or defective. In addition, Russian and American fighter planes were not allowed to take off (by Soviet command) to engage the Luftwaffe during the attack; the reason is not clear.
The loss of American personnel is mild because of adequate warnings and a network of moat gaps away from the aircraft parking area. Russia's losses were much higher as the work crew was ordered to fight fires and disable the anti-personnel bombs while the attack was under way. Butterfly bombs continued to explode in the field for several weeks afterwards. Red Air Force losses include 15 Yak-9, 6 Yak-7, three coaches, Hawker Hurricane, and VIP DC-3. Soviet anti-aircraft fire was intense but random, and strangely presented to illustrate the field for German aircraft. There are conflicting reports about whether Soviet aircraft involve enemies, but because there is no intercept of radar, even American fighters will not be effective.
Well-planned German attacks are led by Oberstleutnant Wilhelm Antrup of KG 55 and performed by He 111Hs and Ju 88s of KG 4, KG 53, KG 55, and KG 27 which operate from bases in Minsk. The operation was dubbed Zaunkoenig . After He 111 leaves, Ju 88 shoots the field at low altitude. He 177s of the Night Reconnaissance Squadrons performs reconnaissance targets, pathfinder duties and bomb damage assessments. No German losses.
- June 22, 1944 Fllable B-17s at Mirgorod and P-51 in Piriatyn were flown to the Soviet air base farther east to anticipate further attacks; they must be returned and sent to the base in Italy as soon as the weather is allowed. It saved many planes, when German bombers attacked Piriatyn and Mirgorod on the night of 22 and 23 June. Piriatyn has a very short runway and has no fuel or ammunition for aircraft. Germany missed Piriatyn while the fuel and ammunition store in Mirgorod was beaten. The Air Transport Command carries aircrews now excessively back to the UK via Mehrabad Airport, Tehran, Iran.
- June 26, 1944
- The losses and damages suffered from the Luftwaffe bombers attack on Poltava and the damage suffered on the way to Russia reduced the number of operational B-17s to a total of 73. All available aircraft were formed into a combined combat wing of three groups for mission execution back to Italy. The aircraft at the dispersion airfield was flown back to Myrhorod and Poltava for service, armed and recharged. This delayed the take-off time until mid-afternoon, meaning that the plane would not arrive in Italy until dusk. Aircraft B-17 with 55 P-51 from Piriatyn, bombed oil refineries and marshaling yards in Drohobycz, Poland ( 49Ã, ° 20,18? N 023Ã, ° 07> 07 ) and then proceed to the Fifteenth Air Force base in southern Italy. One B-17 returned to the Soviet Union due to mechanical problems. The P-51 Air Force met the formation one hour after the attack and escorted the B-17 to Foggia. Planned for Eighth Air Force aircraft to return to base in the UK on 27 June or shortly thereafter as weather conditions permit, but unfavorable forecasts persist. During this period B-17 participated in one of the 15th Air Force missions and P-51s in two missions.
- July 2, 1944
- The Eighth Air Force P-51 joined with other Fifteenth Air Force fighters in escorting 509 heavy bombers on a three-goal mission in Budapest, Hungary; marshaling page ( 47Ã, Â ° 27? 56? N 019 Â ° 05 ? 37? E ) (253 planes); Vecses Airfield ( 47Ã, Â ° 26? 02? N 019 Â ° 15 (142 aircraft) and Shell Oil Refinery ( 47Ã, Â ° 26? 23? N 019 Â ° 03? 43? E ) (114 plane). The P-51 precedes the bombers and performs a free broom in the target area. Aggressive enemy opposition is encountered and 4 P-51s are lost in battle and another P-51 fails to return. USAAF bombers and fighters claim 50 enemy fighters shot down.
- July 3, 1944
- 57 Eight Air Force B-17s were sent, escorted by 38 from P-51, along with 44 Fifteenth Air Force heavy bomber aircraft attacking a swamp and railway shop in Arad, Romania ( 46Ã, Â ° 11? 39? N 021Ã, Â ° 19? 21? E )
- July 5, 1944
- 72 Eighth Air Force B-17 completes FRANTIC-2 by attacking a marshaling page in BÃÆ'¼ziers, France ( 43Ã, Â ° 19? 49? N 003 Â ° 14? 15? E ) along with Fifteenth Air Force B-24 while on the final leg of the mission from Italy to England; 42 P-51 returns to England with B-17. Of the remaining 11 P-51s in Italy, ten returned to England the next day and the last few days later.
After the Poltava disaster, USAAF wants to move the P-61 Black Widow equipped with 427th Combat Squadron to Poltava to provide night air defense radar over the fields. However, the Soviets vetoed this plan, insisting that air defense is their responsibility. The P-61 was transferred to Italy. The shuttle bombing mission is not left for now, but they are postponed until the clutter on the ground can be cleared and airbase defense improves. Realizing that the Soviets could not adequately protect the heavy bombers from night raids, the Americans abandoned plans to permanently place three heavy bomber groups in Soviet airspace.
Due to the loss of fuel and the inability to protect troops, Frantic's next mission consisted of long-range fighters.
- Third Shuttle Mission (Air Force 15)
To keep the project alive, the 15th Air Force subsequently transported P-38 and P-51 aircraft to the Soviet Union at the end of July.
- July 22, 1944
- 76 P-38 and 58 P-51 begin the second shuttle mission of the Air Force 16 by attacking the airfield at Zilistea (Jiliste) ( 45Ã, ° 34? 23 < span> ) and Buz? u, ( 45Ã,  ° 12? 59? N 026Ã,  ° 58? 42? E ) Romania, and landed on a base on the USSR.
- July 25, 1944
- Operating from their USSR base, 34 P-51s and 33 P-38s attack airfields in Mielec, Poland ( 50Ã, Â ° 19? 20? N 021Ã, Â ° 27? 24? E ) and back to USSR. Mielec is the factory location of PZL aircraft.
- July 26, 1944
- The fighters left their USSR headquarters, striking enemy planes in Bucharest-Ploie? ti, the Romanian territory, and returned to their base in Italy, completing FRANTIC-3.
- Fourth Shuttle Mission (Air Force 15)
- August 4, 1944
- In an effort to meet the first direct Soviet demand for the USAAF air strikes, 70 P-38s and P-51s from the Fifteenth Air Force left Italy, attacked the airfield and the city of Foc? ani, Romania ( 45Ã, Â ° 41? 59? N 027 Â ° 07? 56? E ) and landed on base at USSR.
- August 6, 1944
- 60 Air Force Fighters Eighth took off from their base in the Soviet Union, attacked the Craiova raid page ( < span> 44Ã, Â ° 20? 22? N 023Ã, Â ° 47? 25? E ) along with other rail targets in Bucharest-Ploie? Ti, Romania region, and landed at their base in southern Italy, completing FRANTIC-4.
After balancing the losses and damage of the battle against the target value, US military leaders at the Soviet base stopped the bomber-bombing operation.
- Fifth Charge Mission (Eighth Air Force)
- August 6, 1944
- 75 B-17s hit the Kannenberg aircraft factories in Gotenhafen (Gdynia), ( 54 Â ° 34? 50? N 018 Â ° 31? 53> E ) and proceed to base in the Soviet Union. Escort is provided by 154 P-51.
- August 7, 1944
- A shuttle mission was flown in accordance with Soviet requests; 55 B-17s and 29 P-51s attacked an oil refinery in Trzebina, Poland without loss and returned to the base on the USSR.
- August 12, 1944
- All aircraft fly to Fifteenth Air Force base in southern Italy.
- August 13, 1944
- 72 B-17s took off from the Fifteenth Air Force base in southern Italy; three had various problems, others bombed Francazal Airfield, just south of Toulouse, France, ( 43Ã, Â ° 32? 39? N 001 Â ° 22? 04? E ) and then proceed to UK. 62 P-51 Mustang, (part of the shuttle mission force) along with 43 from England, provides escort. No aircraft missing; 70 B-17s and 58 P-51s of land in England. Five B-17s and six P-51s, either left in Italy or in the process of returning there during this mission also flew to England, completing FRANTIC-5.
During this period, the United States at the highest level urged to request the use of the Soviet base for the support of air support and the ongoing Warsaw Polish Army rebellion. However, until Poland was destroyed substantially, Stalin rejected all aid and vetoed this mission. This caused a crisis in Soviet-American relations and changed the US perception of the purpose of the Soviet war between military officers and diplomats.
- Sixth Shuttle Mission (Eighth Air Force)
- September 11, 1944
- 75 Eighth Air Force B-17, with escort 64 P-51, bomb oil refinery in Chemnitz, Germany, ( 50 Â ° 21? 22? N 012 Â ° 55? 24? E ) and landed at base in the Soviet Union.
- September 13, 1944
- 73 B-17, escorted by 63 P-51, taking off from Soviet base, steel bomb and weaponry at DiÃÆ'³sgy? r, Hungary ( 48Ã, Â ° 05? 31? N 020 Â ° 43? 03? E ) and proceed to the Fifteenth Air Force base in southern Italy.
- September 15, 1944
- The Eighth Air Force in the UK sent 110 B-17s to drop supplies to the Polish Army House who took part in the Warsaw Uprising and then proceeded to base on the USSR. However, a weather front was encountered in the North Sea and the bombers were summoned back to England. Escort is provided by 149 P-51 Mustangs; two P-51 (42-106783, 43-24842, 363d FS) collided in the cloud and lost.
- September 17, 1944
- FRANTIC-6 completed as 72 US Air Force 8 B-17 and 59 P-51 flew without a bomb from Italy to England.
- The Seventh Charge Mission (Eighth Air Force)
- September 18, 1944
- After returning due to bad weather on September 15, the last 8th UK-ASSR-Italy-England Air Force mission sent 107 B-17s to supply the Polish Home Army in Warsaw with 1,248 parachute containers dropped. Less than 250 are on target to be picked up by the remaining Polish pockets. One B-17 is lost (43-38175 390th BG 568th BS). Escort provided by 137 P-51; 64 P-51 continues to base on USSR. Two P-51s missing (42-26386, 44-19735, 355th FG 386th/368th FS).
- September 19, 1944
- 100 B-17s and 61 P-51s took off from their base in the Soviet Union, bombed a marshaling page in Szolnok, Hungary, ( 47Ã, Â ° 10? 55? N 020 Â ° 10? 25? E ) and proceeded to the Fifteenth Air Force base in southern Italy. The plane remained in Italy due to bad weather until September 23, when they returned to England, completing FRANTIC-7.
Summary
The attack on the Szolnok train bases was the end of Frantic's major operations, as early targets had been captured by the rapidly progressing Soviet invasion. Following the Polish supply issue, the Molotov Foreign Command put America on notice that they are no longer needed, and a very hostile climate, including violent episodes and burglary theft, took place at the base. USAAF, citing logistical problems and becoming exhausted by the growing stance of the Soviet Union, announced the suspension of Frantic's shuttle mission. Also, at this time air bases in Marianas are available to Americans, and there is no longer a felt need for bases in the Russian Far East. US and Soviet progress in the spring of 1945 ended the need for a space shuttle mission and ATC flew the last US personnel contingent from its base in Poltava in June 1945.
Major problems were attributed to the failure of air defense, but also to the desirability with which Soviet fighters and artillery took aim at American aircraft. Some American planes fell, but the crew survived. From a Soviet perspective, this is due to the inability of US pilots to remain on the corridors, heights, and very limited time windows. On several occasions US aircraft became scattered throughout the region, a very complicated Soviet effort to control and track all foreigners. Soviet officers who were too helpful to Americans were disliked, and one, Air Chief Marshal Alexander Novikov, who had received the Legion of Merit of the United States, was tortured and imprisoned after the war. The issue of Soviet attack on all aircraft looked so serious that when President Roosevelt flew to Yalta in February 1945, America insisted on putting observers at all nearby anti-aircraft sites.
Frantic is peripheral to the air war against Germany because most of the targets can be reached from Italy. The Ukrainian bases are not used for two purposes they can specify: the Polish Army House air supply and the disruption of the slaughter camp operations at Auschwitz and other locations. Because US-Soviet collaboration is considered by Americans entirely a one-way street, it causes bitterness and suspicion, thus affecting the generation of USAF officers.
In addition, the Soviets learned from their own vulnerability to air strikes and the enormous US technological advantages. The USAAF gained insight into Soviet operations, and despite strict restrictions gained some additional photography coverage that would be of great interest later on.
Frantic operations show the flexibility and reach of American logistics that operate under trying conditions. It also shows the political role of air freight logistics in terms of operational support that is not possible by conventional land-based facilities. However, Frantic did not use Allied resources well. Germany considered it a propaganda exercise to impress the Soviets, but all it did was make the Allied alliance more clear.
References
This article incorporates public domain material from the Air Force History Research Agency website http://www.afhra.af.mil/.
- The image on this page is a screen shot of the film: Operation Titanic, Film Department of the United States War, Produced by Army Pictorial Service (Signal Corps), together with Army Air Force, 1945
Bibliography
USAAF prepared a detailed secret report on the operation of the East Command in December 1944 and made it available to the State Department. Preserved at the Air Force History Research Agency (AFHRA) at Maxwell AFB, Alabama.
Four published books provide a detailed analysis of Soviet operations:
- Conversino, Mark: Fighting with the Soviets: Failure of Frantic Operation. University of Kansas Press, 1997. ISBNÃ, 0700608087 OCLCÃ, 35151263
- Deane, John: Strange Alliance. Indiana University Press, 1946, 1973. OCLCÃ, 229419046
- Hansen, Chris: Enfant Terrible: The Times and General Elliott Roosevelt's Scheme. Able Baker, Tucson, 2012. ISBNÃ, 9780615668925 OCLCÃ, 830124072
- Infield, Glenn: The Poltava Affair. McMillan, New York, 1973. OCLCÃ, 628028
External links
- Frantic Soviet-American Photo Operation
- Titanic Operations US Department of War Coverage
Source of the article : Wikipedia
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